Meaning [is] something that happens. (Wolfgang Iser, 1978, p. 22) A story is an event over time, no matter how it is told. Knowing only part of the story is an essential step in the ever-incomplete experience of coming to know it all. We draw data from a text, composing a story from the bits and pieces we are given, assembling the elements in ways that make increasing sense, retreating from too-hasty assessments and dropping our first tentative assumptions when necessary. We may enter the story world, becoming attached to characters and settings, and experiencing real emotion on their behalf. Alternatively, or additionally, we may attend to the surface of the text, admiring and critiquing the ways in which the components of the story are woven together or registering the audacity with which fragments are left floating. However we approach it, to be engrossed in a deliberate form of partial understanding, driving for completion and maybe never entirely letting go, is a multifaceted experience. Iser, in the quotation that begins this chapter, is right about its temporal qualities, but it is not simply something that 'happens'. It is something we perform. How do we do this complex thing?
We are inclined to take it for granted that, once we have learned the basic code-cracking rules, we will be able to sit down with a story in a variety of formats -a novel, say, or a movie, or a digital game -and readily deal with whatever demands it makes of us. We may perhaps be uneasy about our ability to master the controls of an unfamiliar game console, but we assume we will be able to understand the story. But what skills and capacities enable us to make sense of a fiction via a range of different media? How much do we transfer understanding developed in one medium when we initiate the processing of a story told in a different medium?
Such a question is particularly timely in an era of proliferating formats. New variants of electronic readers, 3-D versions of movies and television, radically sophisticated online games, and many virtual community sites of creation and commentary, all challenge the limits of contemporary storytelling. Now is a good time to gain a better understanding of the transferability of narrative awareness. What tools and strategies can we take for granted when we approach a new format? Those who are at ease with the implications of this question, even if they never articulate it in such terms, will be at an advantage in the years to come.
Carol Lee rightly observes that we do not know enough: 'In literary reasoning … determining what concepts are generative has not been well specified ' (2007, p. 113, emphasis added) . In this book, I want to explore some story-processing skills and strategies that generate fictional understanding in three specific media: book, game, film. In these modes, the story's objective existence is confined to abstract black marks on the paper, or assembled pixels on a screen, or frames flickering by at a rate of 24 per second. What enables interpreters to take this unpromising, inert raw material and incarnate it as a vital, living story world inside their own minds? What processes allow this astonishing transformation to take place in ways sufficiently reliable that people can talk to each other in mutually comprehensible terms about the mental worlds they have created, even in times of rapid change in all our communication technologies? And what methods can we develop to observe these highly internal processes at work?
Much of our analysis of the activities and processes of interpretation involves a scholarly exploration of those static objects, the texts. And certainly there is much to be learned from and about the affordances of these texts, to understand what they make possible for interpreters to bring to life. In this book, however, I take a stronger interest in the activity itself, in what people do to enable them to draw from the given symbols and awaken the imaginary in their own minds. And to escape from the solipsistic fallacy very common in much theoretical hypothesizing about reading, viewing, playing -that what people do inside their heads is simply the same as what I do inside my own -I have invited other people to articulate their interpretive processes.
What happens inside our minds as we read, to a certain extent, occurs inside a kind of 'black box'. We cannot read and talk about our reading at the same time (though we can switch very swiftly between the two activities). Consequently, insofar as we truly comprehend what occurs
